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(Transl. by Dr. Jaro Mayda.)
Reviewed by
MIRIAM THERESA ROONEY*

In 1963, under the auspices of the
Louisiana State Law Institute, there was
published a long-desired translation of
one of the most important contributions
to Jurisprudence that the twentieth century has seen. The book is by Frangois
G~ny, sometime Dean of the Faculty of
Law of Nancy, France. It was his
first major work, with the title of Mdthode
d'Interprdtation et Sources en Droit Privd
Positif, issued in 1899, with a second edition in 1919, the latter being reprinted in
1954. This translation into English by Jaro
Mayda, of the University of Puerto Rico
Law School, has been made from the 1954
printing.
G6ny's work has long been acclaimed by
the foremost American jurists, including
the late Deans John H. Wigmore of Northwestern University Law School, and Roscoe Pound of Harvard Law School. Shortly after the second edition of 1919 became
available, Judge Benjamin Cardozo cited
it in numerous footnotes to the pioneering
lectures he gave at Yale Law School,
under the title of The Nature of the Judicial
Process. Indeed, it would appear that some
of the insight which prompted the Cardozo
lectures may well have been derived from
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School
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the stimulus provided by the books of
G6ny.
Because of the intrinsic merit of the
book itself, and because of its undoubted
influence on the so-called "new realists,"
which effected a changed orientation in law
school teaching in the United States between World Wars I and II, it is a matter
for keen regret that the entire work has
not been hitherto available to American
jurists and students generally. Excerpts
were included in the invaluable Modern
Legal Philosophy Series, under the editorship of Dean Wigmore-in the volume on
Method (1917), and in that on Stammler
(1925)-but these have long been out of
print, and scarcely known to most law
students of the last twenty years or so. Revived interest may be anticipated following
the high praise accorded G6ny in the important posthumous collection of Karl
Llewellyn's essays, published by the University of Chicago Press in 1962, under the
title of Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory
and Practice. Since Professor Llewellyn did
not hesitate to use the word "genius" in
referring to the work of G6ny, it is to be
hoped that the latter's expanded fourvolume study, entitled Science et Technique en Droit Privd Positif, published between 1914 and 1924 in France, will also
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find its way into English, but soon.
The problem which confronted Frangois
G6ny as a teacher and jurist grew out of
his concern with the French Code. The
problem, however, is not unique for the
French. Von Ihering had had similar difficulties twenty-five or thirty years earlier
with the German Code; difficulties which
had not been resolved fifteen or twenty
years afterwards, when Eugen Ehrlich established his seminar of "living law" at
Czernowitz. In the United States, where
principles of law had been established by
judicial decisions instead of by legislative
enactments, the problem was no less
troublesome, although less consciously recognized as of universal significance. The
peaceful change described by Mr. Justice
Robert H. Jackson in his book on the
United States Supreme Court crisis of
1937, entitled The Struggle for Judicial
Supremacy, has scarcely yet been acknowledged as evidence of a world-wide struggle
for a shift from rigid legalism toward more
responsible reasonableness in the application of legal rules to the facts of life. For
too many judges the problem has been an
isolated, interior one, confronting their
own consciences alone. The teachers of
the law have rarely provided enough help
from the thinking aloud of the great jurists
of modem times. The task of making G6ny,
Hauriou and R6nard, Von Ihering, Ehrlich
and Radbruch, and Cardozo, Llewellyn,
and Jackson, better known, is the first step
in approaching the situation properly.
The precise problem which confronted
all these jurists is nothing more nor less
than the most insistent problem that faces
all men of the law-the problem of interpretation-of codes, legislative enactments,
and legal documents-the problem of decision-making, of reaching a judgment. The
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result cannot become an arbitrary fiat, at
the price of arousing dissatisfaction, if not
outright revolt. The resolution must convince, as being reasonable, in order to
merit respect. In effect, the problem of the
interpretation of legal rules is implicitly
recognized on all sides as a function of the
intellect rather than the will. It is a matter
involving judgment rather than power. It
calls for acceptance, rather than fearsome
obedience, in its application to reasoning
human beings.
Unfortunately, not all writers about law
and its foundations have been clear on this
point. Since the time of Francisco Suarez,
who wrote perhaps the most extensive
treatise concerning the laws as such, an
overemphasis on the function of the will
increased, paralleling the rise of nationstates, until authority or power, rather than
judgment or justice, became primary in
reaching decisions designed for enforcement. Command tended toward identification with law. That this overemphasis
on will had not always been characteristic,
notwithstanding the testimony of positivistic theorizers like Hobbes, Bentham,
Austin, Kelsen, and others, is manifest in
writings from Glanvill, Bracton, and Aquinas, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries,
to Francisco de Vitoria, in the sixteenthroughly from the time of Magna Carta to
the years when Columbus was discovering
America. With the latter writers, judgment
was recognized as an intellectual task (one
cannot choose what one does not know),
in apportioning to each his own. Its appeal
was for acceptance by dignified human persons, not intimidated subjects. It is the
merit of modern writers like Grny that
their work has tended to shift the emphasis
away from command and enforcement,
toward judgment and fairness. In doing so,
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they restore the intellect to its proper function of directing the will, or choice, in legal
decisions. The dignity of the individual,
whether judge or judged, is thereby enhanced through the respect accorded the
reasoning powers of the persons involved.
The contemporary revolution of rising
expectations, which is seen to be going on
all over the world, is in fact an appeal not
toward violence but rather toward participation in responsible self-government. It
is more properly based on the intellectual
capacities of human beings than on their
accustomed subordination to arbitrary
commands. Jurists trained in the prevailing theories of the last two or three centuries tend to voice alarm over growing
disrespect for law. Had they been more
familiar with the earlier, or with the latest
writings on interpretation of law, they
would be more likely to remember that
most people observe the law naturally, because it is reasonable to do so, and not because they are afraid of getting caught in
non-observance. It is only the unusual, or
abnormal person, the uninformed, or irrational one, generally, who is inclined toward a breach.
In restoring the intellect to primacy in
the interpretation and application of law,
individual jurists are just beginning to find,
through comparative law conferences, that
they are not working alone on problems
which are in fact common to all legal systems. Neither are they working in isolation
from comparable disciplines, especially
theology. Current developments in the latter field, in this Ecumenical era, particularly those concerned with Biblical interpretation, serve to recall that early pages
of the Harvard Law Review' made refer1 Gray, Some Definitions and Questions in Jurisprudence, 6 HARV. L. REV. 21, 33 n.1 (1892);

ence to discussions among three eminent
Harvard law professors- James Bradley
Thayer, John Chipman Gray, and Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr.-over the so-called
Bangorian controversy in the Church of
England, in which the Bishop of Bangor,
Benjamin Hoadley, preaching before the
King on March 31, 1717, interpreted his
text in such a way as to give ultimate
authority to the Bishops instead of the
King. Interpretation, being subsequent to
the command of the lawgiver, was seen to
be more final, and therefore to give greater power. It was the power aspect, apparently, which intrigued Mr. Justice Holmes,
and may well have strengthened his view
of the importance of judges in giving effect
to law. That the Bangorian controversy remained vividly in his memory over many
years is evidenced by his allusion to it in
paying tribute to Professor Gray in 1915,
almost a quarter of a century after it had
been mentioned in the pages of the Harvard Law Review.-'
Because of this obvious concern with
interpretation on the part of Mr. Justice
Holmes, it is all the more disappointing to
find that he, practically alone among
American jurists, failed to appreciate the
original contribution made by Frangois
G6ny to the field. Perhaps it was Harold
Laski, knowing the Holmes concern over
interpretation, who suggested that he review the G6ny volume on Science et Technique which reached these shores as World
War I was closing. At least Laski reprinted,
in the Collected Legal Papers of Justice
Holmes which he edited in 1920, the inThayer, The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV.
129 (1893).
2 See HOLMES, BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED
LETTERS AND PAPERS 134 (Shriver ed. 1936).
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adequate review of the G6ny volume which
was written by Holmes in 1918.3 Countless readers since have formed their attitude
toward natural law on the basis of the
Holmes criticism without ever having read
G6ny or having gained any real comprehension of the problem of interpretation
involved. Rereading the Holmes review
over forty years later, and noting its distressing petulance, one cannot fail to agree
with the suggestion that Holmes could not
have read very far into the G6ny book before presuming to review it.4 The Holmes
comment differs so completely from Cardozo's appreciation of the G6ny approach
to the problem of legal interpretation that it
is all the more astonishing, coming from a
jurist who was earlier concerned with the
problem of interpretation in theology.
The fact that Frangois G6ny is spoken of
as a neo-scholastic jurist may repel some
and attract others. He does mention
Thomas Aquinas occasionally. However,
he does not appear to have studied
Aquinas' writings extensively at first hand.
Most of G6ny's references to scholastic
principles appear to come from Suarez, and
his own attempts at reconciling will and
intellect in the interpretive task disclose a
Suarezian rather than a Thomistic influence. What is of more importance is the
date of his work with reference to the
Encyclical Letters of Pope Leo XIII. The
latter had not only called for fresh attention to the writings of Thomas Aquinas
in confronting contemporary problems,
:1Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40
(1918).
4 LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE

500 n.20 (1962).
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but he had, in 1891, published the novel
Encyclical on the Social Order (Rerum
Novarum) whose influence increases with
the years. This Encyclical did make
an implicit appeal to jurists. It is to
the merit of Frangois G6ny that his first
book, in 1899, took up seriously the Papal
challenge to re-think legal institutions and
the social order. The result should not be
misunderstood in the Holmes manner.
Rather, the powerful analysis of the relation of custom to the French Code, the rejection of juridical conceptualism, and the
call for a free search for objective rules of
interpretation based upon the functioning
of reason and conscience, disclose not a
priori philosophical thinking, but rather an
extraordinarily competent legal mind which
can be favorably compared with the most
fruitful jurists of recent times.
As a pioneer study, G6ny's book on
Mthode says the first, not the last word,
on the technique of legal interpretation.
It provides challenge and stimulus for inventive thinking in the new atom-space era.
It presents a model for dedicated legal
scholarship. If the struggle for judicial
supremacy by the United States Supreme
Court since 1937 is to be seen in proper
focus in the contemporary world-wide demand for law instead of war, and in the
call for greater recognition of the reasoning power of human beings in participation
in self-government and responsibility, this
book must become better known.
The Louisiana State Law Institute, Dr.
Jaro Mayda, and the West Publishing Company, deserve profound thanks for making
this classic available to American students
of the law and its philosophy.

